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Magister artium
The Legal Concept of Slavery 
in the Modern European Legal 
Sphere*1
1. Introduction
Slavery as a legal concept has seemingly lost its relevance in the modern European*2 legal sphere, with the 
term ‘slavery’ being thought to point to an archaic concept. However, developments of the last decade indi-
cate otherwise. In 2001 and 2002, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) dis-
sected the legal concept of slavery in order to determine the applicability of the prohibition of enslavement 
in modern circumstances.*3 The term ‘slavery’ was also incorporated into the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002.*4 Then, in 2005, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) analysed 
the meaning of slavery within the meaning of Article 4 of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).*5 It follows from these developments that the concept 
of slavery cannot have lost its relevance. On the contrary, slavery is even an ever more serious problem of 
modern society rather than an archaic concept.*6 However, not all abuses of a person’s integrity and right to 
self-determination amount to slavery. The question of what practices correspond to the contemporary legal 
1 The article is based on the author’s master’s thesis written and defended in 2013 at the University of Tartu. The original work 
is written in Estonian.
2 For the purpose of the article, the European legal sphere is defi ned as consisting of the 47 member states of the Council of 
Europe. The focus on the modern concept of slavery solely in the European legal sphere is intended to narrow the object of 
the article in consideration of the fact that, fi rst of all, the modern legal concept of slavery cannot reasonably be expected to 
be on the same level globally. In Europe, the legal approach to human rights is extremely progressive in a global comparison. 
Secondly, the historical concept of slavery differs somewhat amongst Western states, particularly between Europe and the 
United States. For the latter, the concept of slavery had a complex intra-territorial relevance, whereas for European states 
in the recent centuries slavery had fi rst and foremost been a colonial matter and, accordingly, slavery was initially more of 
an extraterritorial concept. In consequence, the academic debate addressing the legal concept of slavery and the evolution 
thereof can hardly be compared between these two parts of the world, certainly not within the capacity of one article.
3 ICTY (Trial Chamber) judgement of 22.2.2001, Case IT-96-23-T&IT-96-23/1-T, Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir 
Kovac and Zoran Vukovic; ICTY (Appeals Chamber) judgement of 12.6.2002, Case IT-96-23&IT-96-23/1-A, Prosecutor v. 
Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic.
4 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted on 17 July 1998 and entering into force on 1 July 2002) – 2187 
UNTS 3. 
5 ECtHR judgement of 26.7.2005, Application 73316/01, case of Siliadin v. France, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 
2005-VII.
6 Today, the trade in human beings is referred to frequently as human traffi cking. According to Eurostat’s 2013 report 
on ‘traffi cking in human beings’, the number of cases of human traffi cking increased by 18% from 2008 to 2010, reach-
ing nearly 10,000 victims by 2010. The report is available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-is-new/news/
news/2013/docs/20130415_thb_stats_report_en.pdf (most recently accessed on 12.2.2014).
http://dx.doi.org/10.12697/JI.2014.21.11
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concept of slavery in Europe has raised controversy because of confl icting opinions of recognised scholars, 
tribunals, and courts. The present article is written to shed light on the contemporary approach to the legal 
concept of slavery in Europe by applying an evolutionary approach. 
2. The historical legal concept of slavery in Europe
The historical concept of slavery in Europe comprised foremost the exploitation of indigenous peoples in 
the African colonies of the great powers of Europe.*7 During the Atlantic slave trade, which began in the 
mid-15th century and continued until the second half of the 19th century, an estimated 11 million people 
were transported across the Atlantic Ocean, a practice that continued until the anti-slavery movements 
gained ground in the 19th century.*8 The fi rst anti-slavery movements are considered to have emerged after 
the Napoleonic wars, fairly early in the 1800s.*9 The Congress of Vienna (1814–1815), the Berlin Conference 
(1884–1885), and the Brussels Conference (1889–1890) are regarded as the most noteworthy historical 
events in the development of the international anti-slavery movement in 19th-century Europe*10—all of 
which came together to result in the adoption of declaratory acts with certain restrictions pertaining to 
the slave trade*11. These restrictions, however, were aimed fi rst and foremost at balancing the economic 
interests of confl icting colonial powers. Actual abolition of the slave trade was fi rst incorporated into a 
binding international convention in the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, in 1919.*12 On the initiative of 
the British, the latter led to the adoption of the fi rst international instrument enacted for the abolition of 
not only practising of the slave trade but slavery itself. The Slavery, Servitude, Forced Labour and Similar 
Institutions and Practices Convention was adopted by the League of Nations in 1926, also referred to as the 
Slavery Convention of 1926.*13
It is in the Slavery Convention of 1926 that the fi rst legal defi nition of slavery and enslavement can be 
found. Article 1 of this convention defi nes slavery as ‘the status or condition of a person over whom any or all 
of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised’. Later, the Slavery Convention of 1926 was 
supplemented by the UN’s 1956 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, 
and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery (or ‘the 1956 Supplementary Convention’).*14 Article 1 of 
the 1956 Supplementary Convention listed practices that were to be abolished by the member states, add-
ing that the terms applied ‘whether or not [these were] covered by the defi nition of slavery contained in 
article 1 of the Slavery Convention signed at Geneva on 25 September 1926’. Article 1 of the 1956 Supple-
mentary Convention listed practices such as debt bondage, serfdom, practices of selling women into mar-
riage or doing the equivalent with family members, and the practice of inheriting widowed women, while 
also covering practices whereby children are given away for the purpose of exploiting them. The question of 
whether the Slavery Convention of 1926 covered practices other than chattel slavery (i.e., de jure ownership 
7 T. Burnard, G. Heuman (eds). The Routledge History of Slavery. Abingdon: Routledge 2011, p. 80.
8 J.P. Rodriguez (ed.). The Historical Encyclopedia of World Slavery, Vol. 1 (A–K). Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO 
1997, p. xx.
9 S. Zimmermann. The long-term trajectory of anti-slavery in international politics: From the expansion of the European 
international system to unequal international development. – M. van der Linden (ed.) Humanitarian Intervention and 
Changing Labor Relations: The Long-term Consequences of the Abolition of the Slave Trade. Leiden, The Netherlands: 
BRILL 2010, p. 449.
10 Ibid., p. 663.
11 Act XV, Declaration of the Powers, on the Abolition of the Slave Trade, of the 8th of February, 1815. – Lewis Hertslet (ed.). 
A Complete Collection of the Treaties and Conventions, and Reciprocal Regulations at Present Subsisting Between Great 
Britain and Foreign Powers, and of the Laws, Decrees, and Orders in Council, Concerning the Same; [...], Vol. 1. London 
1840, p. 9 ff.; General Act of the Conference of Berlin Concerning the Congo. – The American Journal of International Law 
3 (1909)/1, Supplement: Offi cial, pp. 7–25; General Act of the Brussels Conference Relative to the African Slave Trade, signed 
in Brussels on 2 July 1890, printed by Harrison and Sons in 1892.
12 S. Miers. Slavery in the Twentieth Century: The Evolution of a Global Problem. Walnut Creek, California: AltaMira Press 
2003, p. 61.
13 Slavery, Servitude, Forced Labour and Similar Institutions and Practices Convention of 1926 (Slavery Convention of 1926), 
adopted on 25 September 1926 and entering into force on 9 March 1927 – 60 L.N.T.S. 253.
14 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, 
adopted on 7 September 1956 and entering into force on 30 April 1957 – 226 U.N.T.S. 3.
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of another person) and whether the 1956 Supplementary Convention confi rmed or overruled the latter 
assumption has led to much debate among academics in the fi eld of law.
In 2008, Jean Allain published a book based on the travaux préparatoires of the 1926 and 1956 slavery 
conventions.*15 In this work, Allain seemed to be arguing that it was not the original intention of the sig-
natories to the 1926 convention for its fi rst article to encompass any other practices than chattel slavery.*16 
However, in other works,*17 Allain seems to agree that the Slavery Convention of 1926 also had to cover de 
facto ownership over people, rather than merely de jure ownership that characterised chattel slavery.*18 
The Secretary-General of the United Nations has explained in one of his memoranda that the wording of 
 Article 1 of the 1956 Supplementary Convention was intended to accept the differences in opinion with 
respect to the scope of the defi nition of slavery in the 1926 convention (by accepting that the practices listed 
in the 1956 Supplementary Convention might or might not have been already covered by the Slavery Con-
vention of 1926).*19
Modern legal scholars, however, can be deemed to have come to consensus by agreeing that the 
1926 defi nition of slavery encompassed more than de jure ownership of people.*20 The remaining differ-
ence in opinion is in the argued extent of de facto ownership. Some authors, Allain among them, argue that 
certain of the practices listed in the 1956 Supplementary Convention must be defi ned as servitude while 
only those entailing de facto ownership over another person can be defi ned as slavery.*21 This argument 
is questionable insofar as, even historically, most practices listed in the 1956 Supplementary Convention 
(all of them in the context of modern society) essentially encompass the de facto exercise of some powers 
attached to the right of ownership over another person.
It can be concluded that even if the 1926 defi nition of slavery was meant to encompass only chattel 
slavery, it must be taken into account that the Slavery Convention of 1926 still was designed to regulate 
colonial matters. Accordingly, its aims did not include regulating intra-territorial matters as later regional 
conventions (such as the ECHR) did. Notwithstanding the therefore seemingly*22 somewhat limited rel-
evance of the scope of the 1926 defi nition of slavery in terms of an evolutionary approach, it must be noted 
that the wording of Article 1 of the 1926 convention allows next to no room for doubt of the assertion that 
the defi nition of slavery in Article 1 was meant to encompass more than merely chattel slavery. First of all, 
the language ‘the status or condition’ indicates that the legal status of a slave was not a precondition for 
slavery within its meaning in the Slavery Convention of 1926 (leaving as it does the option ‘condition’). 
This is further supported by the other part of the defi nition: ‘a person over whom any or all of the powers 
attaching to the right of ownership are exercised’. The wording ‘any of the powers’ indicates that the person 
in question did not need to be entirely reduced to having the status of an object in order to be covered by 
Article 1 of the 1926 convention.
If the 1926 defi nition of slavery indeed already covered de facto ownership of another person, the ques-
tion remains of what practices would have at that point in time amounted to de facto ownership. In answer-
ing this question, one must take several factors into account. Firstly, the above-mentioned limited intra-
territorial effect of the Slavery Convention of 1926 must be recalled. Secondly, the concept of human rights 
had not been developing as progressively as it did after World War II.*23 Thirdly, one must look at states’ 
15 J. Allain. The Slavery Conventions: The Travaux Préparatoires of the 1926 League of Nations Convention and the 
1956 United Nations Convention. Leiden, The Netherlands: BRILL 2008. – DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/
ej.9789004158610.1-841.
16 Ibid., pp. 9, 59.
17 J. Allain. The defi nition of ‘slavery’ in general international law and the crime of enslavement within the Rome Statute. – Guest 
Lecture Series of the Offi ce of the Prosecutor. The Hague, The Netherlands: ICC-CPI individual authors 2007, pp. 12-13.
18 Ibid., pp. 3, 11–12.
19 ECOSOC. The Draft Supplementary Convention of Slavery and Servitude Submitted by the Government of the United King-
dom and Comments Thereon (Memorandum of the Secretary-General), UN Doc. A/C.43/L.1, 2.12.1995, p. 22.
20 N.L. McGeehan. Misunderstood and neglected: The marginalisation of slavery in international law. – The International 
Journal of Human Rights 16(2012)/3, p. 444. See also Offi ce of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. 
Abolishing Slavery and Its Contemporary Forms, UN Doc. HR/PUB/02/4, D. Weissbrodt and Anti-Slavery International. 
New York and Geneva 2002, p. 5.
21 J. Allain (see Note 15), p. 59.
22 At the start of the 21st century, both the ICTY and the ECtHR turned to, inter alia, the 1926 slavery convention for the defi ni-
tion of slavery, thereby re-establishing its relevance.
23 The aftermath of World War II is seen as an era that served as a catalyst for the international human rights movements. 
See, for example, J. Morsink. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent. Philadelphia: 
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economic considerations with regard to slavery in the colonial territories—i.e., what practices could reason-
ably have been abolished at that point in time in colonial territories—while taking into account cultural and 
historical factors in those colonial territories just as fully.
3. Slavery in the modern European legal sphere
In the modern European legal sphere, the term ‘slavery’ can be found in numerous international instru-
ments—inter alia, the Statute of the International Criminal Court*24, the latter being the only modern 
international legal instrument that actually defi nes enslavement. It is important to note that, in Article 7, 
paragraph 2(c), the Statute of the ICC includes, expressis verbis, human traffi cking in the defi nition of slav-
ery, emphasising the traffi cking in women and children (thus expressly bringing the term ‘slavery’ into the 
modern day in line with contemporary practices and circumstances). Although the Statute of the ICC deals 
with slavery as a crime against humanity and, in doing so, sets as preconditions for the applicability of the 
concept of enslavement both for the actions to take place as a part of a systematic attack against civilisation 
and for the perpetrator to have knowledge of the attack, it does not bear relevance with respect to the core 
elements of enslavement as such, the latter being de facto ownership of another person, such as is entailed 
in the case of human traffi cking.
The word ‘slavery’ can also be found in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR)*25, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)*26, and the European Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms*27. None of these three defi ne slavery, 
and both the ICCPR and the ECHR follow the wording of the prohibition of slavery in the UDHR. It must 
be noted that Article 8 of the ICCPR systematically differentiates between slavery and servitude, with these 
two concepts being separated into two paragraphs. The Commentary to the Drafts for the ICCPR confi rms 
that it was the intent of the drafters of the ICCPR to separate the concepts of slavery and servitude and that 
the division with separate paragraphs was developed accordingly.*28 Some argued that human traffi cking 
should be included in the fi rst paragraph prohibiting slavery and the slave trade. This proposal was turned 
down, as the drafters had the intent of expressly addressing only chattel slavery and the accompanying slave 
trade in the fi rst paragraph of Article 8.*29 The second paragraph of Article 8, that prohibiting servitude, 
was meant to include all other practices, similar to slavery, that entail dominance of one man over another 
without the latter actually losing the legal status of a free man.*30
In 2002, however, the monitoring body of the ICCPR, the UN Human Rights Committee (UNHRC), 
stated in its General Comment No. 28, pertaining to the non-discrimination-oriented Article 3 of the ICCPR, 
that under Article 8 of the ICCPR the member states bear the obligation to take measures ‘to eliminate 
traffi cking of women and children, within the country or across borders, and forced prostitution’.*31 The 
UNHRC added that all member states must also provide information on measures taken ‘to protect women 
and children, including foreign women and children, from slavery, disguised, inter alia, as domestic or 
other kinds of personal service’. Regrettably, the UNHRC has not published a General Comment dealing 
exclusively with Article 8 and slavery. However, with the statement made in the General Comment to Arti-
cle 3, the UNHRC left little doubt as to whether slavery within the meaning of Article 8 of the ICCPR is still 
limited to chattel slavery and de jure ownership of another person as it had historically been understood 
University of Pennsylvania Press 1999, p. 36 ff.; J. Donnelly. International human rights: A regime analysis. – International 
Organization 40(1986)/3, p. 614 ff.
24 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted on 17 July 1998 and entering into force on 1 July 2002) – 2187 
U.N.T.S. 3.
25 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN Doc. A/RES/3/217 A, 10.12.1948.
26 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted on 16 December 1966 and entering into force on 23 March 
1976 – 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
27 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted on 4 November 1950 and entering 
into force on 3 September 1953) – 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
28 Secretary-General of the UN. Commentary on the Drafts for the ICCPR. 1955, UN Doc. A.2929, pp. 102–107.
29 Ibid., Section 17.
30 Ibid., Section 18.
31 Equality of rights between men and women, Article 3, 29.3.2000. UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10, General Comment 
No. 28 (General Comments).
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to be. By accepting that slavery can exist in disguised forms, the UNHRC accepted that the modern legal 
concept of slavery codifi ed in Article 8 of the ICCPR in its paragraph 1 encompasses other forms of slavery 
than purely chattel slavery.
In 2001 and 2002, in their judgements in the case of Kunarac et al.*32, both the Trial Chamber and the 
Appeals Chamber of the ICTY conducted a thorough analysis of the legal concept of slavery in European 
history. The ICTY too came to the conclusion that even in 1926 the concept of slavery had to extend to more 
than just traditional chattel slavery. The ICTY proposed a non-exhaustive list of criteria to be considered in 
determination of whether specifi c practices amount to enslavement. The list of criteria included ‘control of 
someone’s movement, control of physical environment, psychological control, measures taken to prevent or 
deter escape, force, threat of force or coercion, duration, assertion of exclusivity, subjection to cruel treat-
ment and abuse, control of sexuality and forced labour’.*33
In a surprising contrast to the UNHRC and the ICTY, the ECtHR came to a different conclusion in its 
2005 judgement in Siliadin v. France*34 when considering the modern legal concept of slavery codifi ed in 
Article 4 of the ECHR. As the ICTY did, the ECtHR referred to the Slavery Convention of 1926; however, 
the ECtHR noted that the 1926 defi nition of slavery corresponds to the ‘classic’ meaning of slavery as it was 
practised for centuries. The ECtHR found that enslavement presupposes depriving a person of his personal 
autonomy and ‘exercising a genuine legal right of ownership’ over that person. The Court concluded that 
the applicant had been kept in servitude but not in slavery. Servitude was defi ned here as a particularly seri-
ous form of denial of freedom, one that, in addition to the obligation to perform certain services for others, 
entails the obligation for the serf to live on another person’s property and the impossibility of altering his 
condition.*35 Thus, unlike the UNHRC, the ICTY, and the defi nition given for slavery in the Statute of the 
ICC, and, arguably, contrary to the 1926 and 1956 slavery conventions, the ECtHR defi ned slavery as being 
limited to de jure ownership of another person, with reference to historical chattel slavery. The ECtHR has 
yet to give an explanation for or comment on the general need to differentiate between servitude and slav-
ery*36, since, unlike in the ICCPR, these two concepts are dealt with in the same paragraph of Article 4 of the 
ECHR, and both are non-derogable under Article 15, paragraph 2 of the same convention. The differentiat-
ing approach of the ECtHR has been heavily criticised*37—in this author’s view, rightly so—because there is 
no historical or contemporary legal basis or practical need for such differentiation.
Later, in 2010, the ECtHR dealt with human traffi cking in its judgement in Rantsev v. Cyprus and 
Russia*38. The Rantsev judgement can be deemed to be one of the most controversial, if not contradictory, 
judgements of the ECtHR in the last decade. The Court noted, inter alia, that the Rantsev case was, as the 
Siliadin case was, one dealing with human traffi cking, although in the Siliadin judgement the Court never 
addressed the issue of human traffi cking. What is more, the Court referred to the judgement of the Appeals 
Chamber of the ICTY in Kunarac et al., in which the latter had defi ned slavery as entailing more than what 
the ECtHR had accepted in Siliadin. The ECtHR did not express its opinion on the ICTY judgement but 
nonetheless included its core theoretical approach in the Rantsev judgement. The ECtHR then considered 
the fact that ‘traffi cking in human beings, by its very nature and aim of exploitation, is based on the exercise 
of powers attaching to the right of ownership. It treats human beings as commodities to be bought and sold 
and put to forced labour, often for little or no payment, usually in the sex industry but also elsewhere’, lan-
guage that corresponds to the defi nition of slavery in the Slavery Convention of 1926. Therefore, an obvious 
question arises: did the ECtHR fi nally accept that slavery can exist in other forms than chattel slavery? That 
is, did it conclude that the concept of slavery covers human traffi cking, which entails de facto but not de jure 
ownership of another person (with the latter being legally precluded in all member states of the Council of 
Europe)? Regrettably, the ECtHR did not further explain what it meant with the quoted statement. Instead, 
32 See Note 3.
33 Ibid., Trial Chamber judgement of 22.2.2001, Section 543, repeated in the Appeals Chamber judgement of 12.6.2002, Section 
24.
34 See Note 5.
35 Ibid., Section 122.
36 ECtHR judgement of 7.1.2010, Application 25965/04, case of Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, Reports of Judgments and Deci-
sions 2010. Setting aside the comment in the case Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia regarding the fact that, in terms of human 
traffi cking falling within the scope of Article 4 of the ECHR, there is no need to differentiate between these two concepts.
37 See, for example, N.L. McGeehan (see Note 20), full article.
38 ECtHR judgement of 7.1.2010, Application 25965/04, case of Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, Reports of Judgments and 
Decisions 2010.
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the Court found that in the case of human traffi cking there was no need to differentiate among slavery, 
servitude, and forced or compulsory labour, as human traffi cking is clearly contrary to the meaning and 
purpose of Article 4 of the ECHR.*39 In this regard, the Court’s approach must be celebrated, since adher-
ence to technicalities of the law should not be a purpose in itself, especially when human rights are at issue.
In the case law following the Rantsev judgement, the ECtHR, having seemingly forgone the differen-
tiating approach, still went on to refer to its positions in Siliadin.*40 This must be deemed quite contradic-
tory, since the Court had found in the Rantsev judgement that the Siliadin case too was related to human 
traffi cking, then, in turn, concluded in the judgement in C.N. and V. v. France*41 that the latter had more in 
common with the Siliadin case rather than the Rantsev case. In other words, having set aside the differen-
tiating approach in Rantsev, the Court nevertheless used that approach in later cases, ones that it (though 
arguably indirectly) found to be similar to the Rantsev case.
Although the ECtHR has yet to set aside its theoretical differentiating approach established in Siliadin, 
the principle of the ECHR being a living instrument*42 leaves room for improvement and allows one to 
assume that the ECtHR will eventually follow other international legal authorities in Europe in accepting 
that the legal concept of slavery has evolved beyond chattel slavery, if it can even be said to have ever been 
confi ned to such narrow limits (given that even serfdom did not amount to de jure ownership of another 
person). It must be emphasised that the ECtHR has made clear in its case law that the ultimate goal of the 
ECHR is to ensure the protection of human rights to the highest possible standards and that those stan-
dards rise in tandem with societal development.*43 In light of this, it cannot be accepted that the ECHR 
covers the prohibition of slavery only as an outdated and archaic concept, one that has no relevance in the 
contemporary European legal sphere. Accordingly, the concept of slavery within the meaning of Article 4 of 
the ECHR must be deemed to encompass more than merely de jure ownership over another person.
4. Conclusions
It can be concluded that the legal defi nition of slavery as involving de facto ownership of another person 
per se has not changed since the signing of the Slavery Convention of 1926. However, its practical effect has 
moved beyond the social and economic circumstances of the early 20th century. The understanding of what 
constitutes de facto ownership of another person has evolved side by side with societal changes; one of the 
most important factors here being the events that took place during World War II. The latter events are 
deemed to have been the starting point of the progressive approach to human rights that has now become 
one of the most important hallmarks of Europe (at least in the legal sphere).
It must be emphasised that three distinct stages in the evolution of the concept of slavery can be delin-
eated. The fi rst is that of the early 20th century and the Slavery Convention of 1926, which was aimed at 
abolishing slavery and the slave trade as it manifested itself in the colonial territories and with an emphasis 
on the historic Atlantic slave trade. In that era, the prohibition of slavery had little intra-territorial mean-
ing in continental Europe. In the middle of the 20th century, World War II marks the beginning of the 
second stage of development, during which human rights instruments were drafted to deal with specifi c 
issues of continental Europe and in mindfulness of the atrocities of the war. Therefore, it can be argued 
that the UDHR, the ECHR, and the ICCPR initially also addressed traditional slavery, since one could eas-
ily argue that it had been exercised during the war to the disadvantage of certain social groups. The third 
stage can be said to have begun after the Cold War and in the years following the collapse of the USSR. 
That stage began in the late 20th century and extends to the present day. The contemporary international 
legal system can be said to be divided in the way that international criminal law deals with extreme matters 
such as systematic enslavement, whereas human rights law in Europe generally concerns individual cases 
(although they might have a systematic dimension, as seen in Rantsev). When one remembers that legal 
ownership of another person is not possible—except in extreme situations, such as wars, which are dealt 
39 Ibid., Sections 277–281.
40 See, for example, the ECtHR judgement of 11.10.2012, Application 67724/09, case of C.N. and V. v. France.
41 Ibid.
42 See, for example, the ECtHR judgement of 25.4.1978, Application 5856/72, case of Tyrer v. The United Kingdom, Series 
A-26, Section 31.
43 Ibid.
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with in international criminal law—the concept of slavery in human rights law in the European legal sphere 
cannot but address de facto ownership of another person, slavery in less extreme terms than the historical.
For determination of what must be understood to be de facto ownership of another person in contem-
porary terms, the list of criteria set forth by the ICTY can be deemed most suitable. Being non-exhaustive, 
this list is fl exible enough to allow the prohibition of slavery to be used for purposes of employing the strict-
est approach and thereby reaching the highest possible standard of protection of human rights—which, 
after all, is what has been determined by the ECtHR to be the ultimate goal of the central human rights 
protection instrument, the ECHR.
